Abstract. This paper investigates to what extent a purely symbolic approach to decision making under uncertainty is possible, in the scope of artificial intelligence. Contrary to classical approaches to decision theory, we try to rank acts without resorting to any numerical representation of utility or uncertainty, and without using any scale on which both uncertainty and preference could be mapped. Our approach is a variant of Savage's where the setting is finite, and the strict preference on acts is a partial order. It is shown that although many axioms of Savage theory are preserved and despite the intuitive appeal of the ordinal method for constructing a preference over acts, the approach is inconsistent with a probabilistic representation of uncertainty. The latter leads to the kind of paradoxes encountered in the theory of voting. It is shown that the assumption of ordinal invariance enforces a qualitative decision procedure that presupposes a comparative possibility representation of uncertainty, originally due to Lewis, and usual in nonmonotonic reasoning. Our axiomatic investigation thus provides decision-theoretic foundations to the preferential inference of Lehmann and colleagues. However, the obtained decision rules are sometimes either not very decisive or may lead to overconfident decisions, although their basic principles look sound. This paper points out some limitations of purely ordinal approaches to Savage-like decision making under uncertainty, in perfect analogy with similar difficulties in voting theory.
Introduction
Traditionally, decision making under uncertainty (DMU) relies on a probabilistic framework. When modeling a decision maker's rational choice between acts, it is assumed that the uncertainty about the state of the world is described by a probability distribution, and that the ranking of acts is done according to the expected utility of the consequences of these acts. This proposal was made by economists in the 1950s, and justified on an axiomatic basis by Savage [1972] and colleagues. More recently, in artificial intelligence, this setting has been applied to problems of planning under uncertainty, and is at the root of the influence diagram methodology for multiplestage decision problems.
However, in parallel to these developments, artificial intelligence has witnessed the emergence of a new decision paradigm called qualitative decision theory, where the rationale for choosing among decisions no longer relies on probability theory or numerical utility functions. Papers by Brafman and Tennenholtz [1997] and Doyle and Thomason [1999] have stressed the main issues in this area. Motivations for this new proposal are twofold. On the one hand, there exists a tradition of symbolic processing of information in artificial intelligence, and it is not surprising this tradition should try and stick to symbolic approaches when dealing with decision problems. On the other hand, the emergence of new information technologies has generated many new decision problems involving intelligent agents like information systems or autonomous robots.
An information system is supposed to help an end-user retrieve information and choose among courses of action, based on a limited knowledge of the user needs. It is not clear that numerical approaches to DMU, which were developed in the framework of economics, are fully adapted to these new problems. Expected utility theory might sound too demanding a tool for handling queries of end-users. Numerical utility functions and subjective probabilities presuppose a rather elaborate elicitation process that is worth launching for making strategic decisions that need to be carefully analyzed. Users of information systems are not necessarily capable of describing their state of uncertainty by means of a probability distribution, nor may they be willing to quantify their preferences [Boutilier 1994 ]. This is typical of electronic commerce, or recommender systems, for instance. In many cases, it sounds more satisfactory to implement a choice method that is fast and based on rough information about user preferences and knowledge. Moreover the expected utility criterion makes full sense for repeated decisions whose successive results accumulate (for instance money in gambling decisions). Some decisions made by end-users are rather one-shot, in the sense that getting wrong advice one day cannot always be compensated by good advice the next day. Note that this kind of application often needs multiple-criteria decision making rather than DMU. However there is a strong similarity between the two problems. Besides, there is no need for a precise modeling of information in the handling of many queries to recommender systems, and qualitative information is sometimes good enough, because little is at stake with such queries.
In the case of autonomous robots, conditional plans are often used to monitor the robot behavior, and the environments of the robots are sometimes only partially observable. The theory of partially observable Markov decision processes leads to highly complex methods, because it involves handling infinite state spaces. A qualitative, finitistic description of the goals of the robot and of its knowledge of the environment might lead to more tractable methods (see Sabbadin [2000] for instance). Besides, the expected utility criterion is often adopted because of its mathematical properties (it enables dynamic programming principles to be used). However it is not clear that this criterion is always the most cogent one, for instance in risky environments, where cautious policies should be followed.
It is thus tempting to try and define decision rules that would be simple to implement and not require from the user numerical information he/she would not be able to provide. Formulating decision problems in a symbolic way may also be more compatible with a declarative expression of uncertainty and preferences in the setting of some logic-based languages [Boutilier 1994; Thomason 2000] .
So there is a need for qualitative decision rules. However, there is no real agreement on what "qualitative" means. Some authors have assumed incomplete knowledge about classical additive utility models, whereby the utility function is specified via symbolic constraints (Lang [1996] and Bacchus and Grove [1996] , for instance). Others have used sets of integers and the like to describe rough probabilities or utilities [Tan and Pearl 1994] . Lehmann [1996] injected some qualitative concepts of negligibility into the classical expected utility framework. However, some approaches have been genuinely qualitative in the sense that they do not involve any form of quantification. Boutilier [1994] exploited preferential inference of nonmonotonic reasoning and made decisions on the basis of the most plausible states of nature. Brafman and Tenenholtz [1996] adopted a pessimistic attitude to decision making, and cast the maximin criterion in a logical setting. Dubois and Prade [1995c] generalized the maximin criterion in the setting of possibility theory and proposed a Von Neumann and Morgenstern style axiomatization. However, none of these approaches are in agreement with the most classical of decision theories, that is, Savage's [1972] . The natural question is then whether it is possible to found rational decision making in a purely qualitative setting, without moving too far away from Savage.
We take it for granted that a qualitative decision theory is one that does not resort to the full expressive power of numbers for the modeling of uncertainty nor for the representation of utility. Two lines can be followed in agreement with this definition: the relational approach and the absolute approach. Following the relational approach, the decision maker uncertainty is represented by a partial ordering relation among events (expressing relative likelihood), and the utility function is just encoded as another ordering relation between potential consequences of decisions. This approach is close to the framework of voting theories after Arrow [1951] , Sen [1986] , etc. The advantage is that it is faithful to the kind of elementary information users can directly provide. The other approach [Dubois et al. 2001b ] presupposes the existence of a totally ordered scale (typically a finite one) for grading both likelihood and utility. Decision rules generalizing maximin and maximax criteria can be defined on this ordinal scale. This approach is very simple but has some shortcomings. First, the obtained ranking of decisions is bound to be coarse since there cannot be more classes of preference-equivalent decisions than levels in the finite scale used. Moreover, the assumption of a common scale for grading uncertainty and preference (which we call the commensurability assumption) is strong. It can be questioned, although it is already taken for granted in classical decision theory (via the notion of certainty equivalent of an uncertain event). When only relations are used, one does not make such an assumption, and the expressive power of purely relational approaches is thus worth investigating.
The investigation carried out in this paper is in the setting of decision theory after Savage [1972] . Namely, we address the following question: if an uncertainty relation on events is given, and a preference relation on consequences is independently given as well, how can a preference relation on acts be rationally constructed with a purely symbolic approach, without assuming that the uncertainty relation and the preference relation can both be mapped to some unique scale be it numerical or ordinal? The aim of the paper is to lay bare the formal consequences of adopting such a purely ordinal point of view on DMU, while retaining as much as possible from Savage's axioms, and especially the "sure-thing principle" which is the cornerstone of the theory.
Suppose only a relative likelihood relation on events that describes a decision maker's knowledge about the state of the world, and a preference ordering on the consequences of feasible acts, are available. A natural, intuitively appealing technique that solves the act-ranking problem is as follows: suppose an act f is preferred to another act g if the (relative) likelihood that f outperforms g is greater than the likelihood that g outperforms f . This is called the likely dominance rule. In our investigation, Savage's framework is slightly relaxed so as to allow for intransitive indifference between acts. This is necessary in order to avoid trivialization. Moreover, we assume that both the set of states and the set of consequences are finite. An axiom, originally due to Fishburn [1975] in another context, is then added. It expresses the purely ordinal nature of the decision criterion, and it is proved to enforce the likely dominance rule.
More precisely, the results of this paper show the following:
(1) There is no other way of building a preference on acts from an uncertainty relation on events and a preference relation of consequences, in the sense of reasonable assumptions coming from Savage's framework and the requirement of a purely qualitative (ordinal) approach. (2) The decision rule generated by the axiomatic framework is generally incompatible with a probabilistic representation of uncertainty. Indeed, applying it to an ordering on events induced by a probability measure may lead to a nontransitive strict preference relation on acts. The ordinal Savagean framework actually leads to a representation of uncertainty that is closely related to the ordering of formulas in the nonmonotonic logic ("System P") of Kraus et al. [1990] , also exhibited by Friedman and Halpern [1996] . (3) The enforced simple decision criterion is a mixture of lexicographic priority and unanimity. Preferred acts are selected by restricting to the most plausible states of the world, and using a unanimity rule on these maximally plausible states. Ties are broken by lower-level oligarchies. However cognitively appealing it may look, it has a limited expressive and decisive power.
The difficulty met by the purely relational approach to the decision problem under uncertainty is very similar to the one faced in voting theories (see, for instance, Moulin [1988] ) where a priori natural procedures, like the Condorcet [1785] pairwise majority rule, exhibit counterintuitive intransitivities; see also Sen [1986] . These results question the very possibility of a purely ordinal solution to this problem, in the framework of transitive and complete preference relations on acts. This kind of impediment was already pointed out by Doyle and Wellman [1991] for preference-based default theories. This paper extends preliminary results that were presented in Dubois et al. [1997] . It is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls some classical decision rules and Savage's framework for DMU. Section 3 presents the likely dominance rule that can rank acts from a purely ordinal knowledge of uncertainty on states, and utility on consequences. This method is similar to the pairwise majority rule in social choice but is much more general. It is shown that this decision rule is basically inconsistent with Savage's axioms. An axiomatic framework for ordinal DMU is presented in Section 4. This framework is the one of Savage but the indifference between acts is allowed not to be transitive. An ordinal invariance axiom is introduced and it is proved that it enforces the likely dominance rule. Section 5 studies the type of subjectivist uncertainty theory induced by purely ordinal Savage-like frameworks with or without the ordinal invariance assumption. It shows that a connection exists between Savage's framework, adapted to ordinal decision criteria, and nonmonotonic reasoning after Kraus et al. [1990] : namely the subjective likelihood relation induced from the decision-making axioms is equivalently represented by a preferential consequence relation. Section 6 exhibits a model of the set of axioms, where uncertainty is represented by a single weak ordering of states, in the framework of comparative possibility theory [Lewis 1973; ]. The relation on events induced by the likely dominance expresses relative likelihood and plays the role of a probability measure, but only its strict part is transitive. This type of relation refines both possibility and necessity relations. A representation theorem for ordinal DMU is then provided in terms of a family of possibility relations. Section 7 studies the type of decision rules generated by the theory. Proofs of the results appear in Appendix B.
Background on Decision Theory
A decision problem is cast in the framework of a set S of states (of the world) and a set X of potential consequences of decisions. States encode possible situations, states of affairs, etc. An act is viewed as a mapping f from the state space to the consequence set, namely, in each state s ∈ S, an act f produces a well-defined result f (s) ∈ X . The decision maker must rank acts without knowing what the current state of the world is in a precise way. The consequences of an act can often be ranked in terms of their relative appeal: some consequences are judged better than others. This is often modeled by means of a numerical utility function u which assigns to each consequence x ∈ X a utility value u(x) ∈ r. Classically there are two approaches to modeling the lack of knowledge of the decision maker about the state. The most widely found assumption is that there is a probability distribution p on S. It is either obtained from statistics (this is called decision under risk [Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944]) or it is a subjective probability supplied by the agent via suitable elicitation methods. Then the most usual decision rule is based on the expected utility criterion :
whereby act f is strictly preferred to act g if and only if EU( f ) > EU(g). Another proposal is the maximin criterion [Arrow and Hurwicz 1972] . It applies when no information about the current state is available, and it ranks acts according to its worst consequence:
This criterion, first proposed by Wald [1950] , has the major defect of being extremely pessimistic. In practice it is never used for this reason. An optimistic counterpart of W ( f ) is obtained by turning minimum into maximum. Hurwicz [1951] has proposed using a weighted average of W ( f ) and its optimistic counterpart, where the weight bearing on W ( f ) is viewed as a degree of pessimism of the decision maker. Other decision rules have been proposed, especially some that generalize both EU( f ) and W ( f ); see Jaffray [1989] and Schmeidler [1989] , among others. Dubois and Prade [1995c] and Dubois et al. [2001b] proposed a nonnumerical generalization of W ( f ) on an ordinal scale. However, the expected utility criterion is by far the most commonly used one. Savage [1972] proposed an axiomatic framework for justifying the use of expected utility, which we shall briefly recall here as our ordinal approach to DMU heavily relies on it. Savage was interested in proving that rational decision makers should use this criterion when ranking acts according to their preferences. From a complete and transitive preference relation over acts, Savage derived a likelihood relation representing uncertainty on events in the state space, and a preference relation on the consequences. If the preference on acts satisfies suitable properties, according to which the decision maker is considered to be "rational," then the uncertainty on events can be represented by a unique probability distribution, the preference relation on consequences by a numerical utility function on an interval scale, and the acts can be ranked according to their expected utility.
Let us recall this framework. It is adapted to our purpose of devising a purely ordinal approach because the starting point of Savage's [1972] theory is indeed based on relations and their representation on an interval scale. Suppose a decision maker supplies a preference relation ≥ over acts. An act is modeled as a mapping f : S → X , and X S usually denotes the set of all such mappings. In Savage's approach, any mapping in the set X S is considered as a possible act (even if it is an imaginary one rather than a feasible one). The first requirement stated by Savage [1972] is as follows:
Although Savage [1972] had his own defense of this axiom, it is unavoidable in the scope of utility theory: if acts are ranked according to expected utility, then the preference over acts will be transitive, reflexive, and complete ( f ≥ g or g ≥ f for any f, g).
What this axiom also implies, if X and S are finite, is that there exists a totally ordered scale, say that can serve to evaluate the worth of acts. Indeed the indifference relation ( f ∼ g if and only if f ≥ g and g ≥ f ) is an equivalence relation, and the set of equivalence classes, denoted X S /∼, is totally ordered via the strict preference >. If [ f ] and [g] denote the equivalence classes of f and g, [ f ] > [g] holds if and only if f > g holds for any representatives of each class. So it is possible to rate acts on = X S /∼ and [ f ] is the qualitative utility level of f . An event is modeled by a subset of states, understood disjunctively. To say that an event A occurs means that one of the states in A is the real state. Events are the same as propositions of the form "s ∈ A." The set of acts is closed under the following combination involving acts and events. Let A ⊆ S be an event, f and g two acts, and fAg denote the act such that
For instance, f may mean "bypass the city," g may mean "cross the city," and A represent the presence of a traffic jam. Then S represents descriptions of the state of the road network, and X represents a time scale for the time spent by an agent who drives to his/her working place. fAg then means: bypass the city if there is a traffic jam, and cross the city otherwise. More generally, the notation f 1 A 1 f 2 A 2 , . . . , A n-1 f n A n , where A 1 , . . . , A n-1 , A n is a partition of S, denotes the act whose result is f i (s) if s ∈ A i , ∀i = 1, . . . , n. fAg is actually short for fAgA c , where A c is the complement of A. Savage [1972] proposed an axiom that he called the sure-thing principle. It requires that the relative preference between two acts does not depend on states where the acts have the same consequences. In other words, the preference between fAh and gAh does not depend on the choice of h:
where "iff" is shorthand for "if and only if".
For instance, if you bypass the city ( f ) rather than cross it (g) in case of a traffic jam (A), this preference does not depend on what you would do in case of fluid traffic (A c ), say, cross the city (h = g), bypass it anyway (h = f ), or make a strange decision such as staying at home. Grant et al. [2000] pointed out that the name sure-thing principle for this postulate was not fully justified since it is hard to grasp where the sure thing is. Grant et al. proposed several expressions of a genuine sure-thing principle. One version that follows was called the weak sure-thing principle (WSTP):
The above property really means that the weak preference of f over g does not depend on whether A occurs or not. It is obvious that WSTP is implied by S1 and S2, since from fAg ≥ g = gAg and S2 we derive f = fAf ≥ gAf and, using transitivity of ≥ due to S1, f ≥ g follows.
The sure-thing principle enables two notions to be simply defined, namely, conditional preference and null events: Definition 1. f is said to weakly preferred to g, conditioned on A, if and only if ∀h, fAh ≥ gAh. This is denoted by ( f ≥ g) A .
Clearly, the sure-thing principle enables ( f ≥ g) A to hold as soon as fAh ≥ gAh for some h. Conditional preference ( f ≥ g) A means that f is weakly preferred to g when the state space is restricted to A, regardless of the decision made when A does not occur. Note that f ≥ g is short for ( f ≥ g) S . Moreover ( f ≥ g) Ø always holds, for any f and g, since it is equivalent to the reflexivity of ≥ (i.e., h ≥ h). Definition 2. An event A is said to be null if and
Any nonempty set of states A on which all acts make no difference is then like the empty set: the reason why all acts make no difference is because this event is considered impossible by the decision maker.
Conditional preference enables the weak sure-thing principle to be expressed like a unanimity principle in the terminology of voting theory, provided that the sure-thing principle holds.
PROPOSITION 1. Under axiom S2, WSTP is equivalent to unanimity.
Note that in the absence of S2, axiom U implies axiom WSTP but not the converse. The unanimity postulate has been formulated by Lehmann [1996] .
Among acts in X S are constant acts such that: ∃ x ∈ X, ∀ s ∈ S, f (s) = x. They are denoted fx. It seems reasonable to identify the set of constant acts { fx, x ∈ X } and X . The preference on X can be induced from (X S , ≥) as follows:
Definition 3. Given (X S , ≥), the preference relation ≥ P on X is of the form ∀x, y ∈ X, x ≥ P y if and only if fx ≥ fy.
This definition is self-consistent provided that the preference between constant acts is not altered by conditioning. This is the third Savage [1972] 
, which is denoted f ≥ P g. Clearly, Pareto dominance should imply weak preference for acts. And indeed under S1, S2, and S3,
The preference on acts also induces a likelihood relation among events. For this purpose, it is enough to consider the set of binary acts, of the form fxAfy, which due to S3 can be denoted xAy, where x ∈ X, y ∈ X , and x > P y. Clearly for fixed x > P y, the set of acts {x, y} S is isomorphic to the set of events 2 S . However the restrictions of (X S , ≥) to {x, y} S may be inconsistent with the restriction to {x , y } S for other choices of consequences x > P y . A partial ordering among events can, however, be recovered, as suggested by Lehmann [1996] :
∀A, B ⊆ S, A ≥ L B if and only if xAy ≥ xBy, ∀x, y ∈ X such that x > P y.
In order to get a weak order of events, Savage [1972] introduced a new postulate:
Under this property, the choice of x, y ∈ X with x > P y does not affect the ordering between events in terms of binary acts, namely: A ≥ L B is short for ∃ x > P y, xAy ≥ xBy.
Last, Savage [1972] assumed that the set X is not trivial:
Axiom S5. X contains at least two elements x, y such that fx > fy (or x > P y).
Under S1 to S5, the likelihood relation on events is a comparative probability ordering (see Fishburn [1986] and Section 3). Savage [1972] introduced another postulate that enabled him to derive the existence (and uniqueness) of a numerical probability measure on S that can represent the likelihood relation ≥ L . This axiom reads:
Axiom S6. For any f , g with f > g in X S and any x ∈ X , there is a partition
Under the postulates S1 to S6, not only can ≥ L be represented by a numerical probability function but (X S , ≥) can be represented by the expected utility of acts u( f ) = s∈S p(s)u( f (s)), where the utility function u represents the relation ≥ P on X uniquely, up to a linear transformation. However S6 presupposes that the state space S is infinite so that the probability of S i can be made arbitrary small, thus not altering the relation f > g when x is very bad (so that x S i f > g) or very good (so that f > x S i g). In contrast, we assume that both S and X are finite in this paper, and S6 is trivially violated in such a finite setting. In that case, it is well known that the axioms of comparative probability do not ensure that the likelihood relation can always be represented by a probability (see Fishburn [1986] ). This feature does not matter here since our aim is to remain at the ordinal level. However, there is to our knowledge no representation of subjective expected utility that would assume a purely finite setting for states and consequences. Savage's [1972] approach to the justification of expected utility starts from a ranking of acts. However the real decision problem is to build this relation from information regarding the likelihood of states and the decision maker preference on consequences. This section introduces a natural decision rule that computes such a preference relation on acts from a purely symbolic perspective, no longer assuming a probability function on S is available or a numerical utility function on X . Moreover, we assume the set of states is finite, contrary to the framework of Savage, and we do not use axiom S6.
The Likely Dominance Rule
A "likelihood" relation on the set of events is an irreflexive and transitive relation > L on 2 S , and a nontrivial one (S > L Ø,), faithful to deductive inference. A > L B means that event A is more likely than B. Given that an event A stands for a proposition "s ∈ A," a deductive inference " A implies B" is modeled by the inclusion A ⊆ B. So, if A ⊆ B then A > L B should not hold (inclusion-monotony). The inclusion-monotony property states that if A implies B, then A cannot be more likely than B. Let us define the weak likelihood relation ≥ L induced from > L via complementation, and the indifference relation ∼ L as usual:
The preference relation on the set of consequences X is supposed to be a weak order (a complete preordering, e.g., Roubens and Vincke [1985] ). Namely, ≥ P is a reflexive and transitive relation, and completeness means x ≥ P y or y ≥ P x, ∀x, y ∈ X, x ≥ P y means that consequence x is not worse than y. The induced strict preference relation is derived as usual: x > P y if and only if x ≥ P y and not y ≥ P x. It is assumed that X has at least two elements x and y s.t. x > P y. The assumptions pertaining to ≥ P are natural in the scope of numerical representations of utility; however, we do not require that the weak likelihood relation be a weak order too.
If the likelihood relation on events and the preference relation on consequences are not comparable, a natural way of lifting the pair ( > L , ≥ P ) to X S is as follows: an act f is more promising than an act g if and only if the event formed by the disjunction of states in which f gives better results than g is more likely than the event formed by the disjunction of states in which g gives results better than f . A state s is more promising for act f than for act g if and only if f (s) > P g (s) . The following notation is adopted in the paper: while f > P g stands for:
Accordingly, we define the preference between acts (≥), the corresponding indifference (∼) and strict preference (>) relations as follows:
This approach looks very natural, and is the first one that comes to mind when information is only available under the form of an ordering of events and an ordering of consequences and when the preference and uncertainty scales are not comparable. Events are only compared to events, and consequences to consequences. Another definition that may look as natural uses the weak preference ordering and is obtained by changing [
However, in the scope of Savage's [1972] approach, this alternative definition should be equivalent to Definition 5, because of the sure-thing principle: the event [ f ∼ P g] should not affect the likelihood ordering between two events that both contain it.
The properties of the relations ≥, ∼, and > on X S will depend on the properties of ≥ L with respect to Boolean connectives. The most obvious choice for ≥ L is a comparative probability enforced by axioms S1 to S5 (e.g., Fishburn [1986] 
Definition 6. ≥ L is a comparative probability if and only if
Note that these properties do not ensure a numerical additive representation of ≥ L . A first negative result is that if ≥ L is a comparative probability ordering then the strict preference relation > in X S is not necessarily transitive.
Example 1. A very classical and simple example of undesirable lack of transitivity is when S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } and X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } with x 1 > P x 2 > P x 3 , and the comparative probability ordering is generated by a uniform probability on S. Suppose three acts f, g, h such that
The likely dominance rule yields f > g, g > h, h > f . Note that the presence of this cycle does not depend on figures of utility that could be attached to consequences insofar as the ordering of utility values is respected for each state. In contrast, the ranking of acts induced by expected utility completely depends on the choice of utility values, even if we keep the constraint u(x 1 ) > u(x 2 ) > u(x 3 ). The reader can check that, by symmetry, any of the three lin- 
This situation can be viewed as an analog of the Condorcet [1785] paradox in social choice, here in the setting of DMU. Indeed the problem of ranking acts on the basis of the likelihood relation > L and the preference on consequences ≥ P can be cast in the setting of a voting problem (see Moulin [1988] for an introduction to voting methods). Let V be a set of voters, C be a set of candidates, and ≥ v be a relation on C that represents the preference of voter v on the set of candidates. ≥ v is a weak order, by assumption. The decision method consists in constructing a relation
be the set of voters who find c 1 more valuable than c 2 , and |V (c 1 , c 2 )| the cardinality of that set. Then the social preference relation R on C is defined as follows by Condorcet:
This is the so-called pairwise majority rule. It is well known that such a relation is often not transitive and may contain cycles. More generally, Arrow [1951] proved that the transitivity of R is impossible with natural requirements on the voting procedure such as independence of irrelevant alternatives, unanimity, and nondictatorship (i.e., R = ≥ v for the same voter v systematically).
The probabilistic version of the likely dominance rule is very similar to the Condorcet procedure, taking V = S, C = X S , and considering for each s ∈ S the relation R s on acts such that
Computing the probability, Prob([ f > P g]) is a weighted version of |V (c 1 , c 2 )| with V = S, c 1 = f, c 2 = g, which explains the intransitivity phenomenon. However, the likely dominance rule makes sense for any inclusion-monotonic likelihood relation between events and is then much more general than the Condorcet [1785] pairwise majority rule. The above counterexample suggests that the likely dominance rule is generally not coherent with axioms (S1 to S5) of Savage's [1972] setting for DMU since they enforce comparative probability relations as representing subjective uncertainty, and S1 assumes the transitivity of the preference relation over acts. Here we shall precisely describe the reason for this incompatibility.
More precisely, the following result explains why the probabilistic version of likely dominance may violate the transitivity of the strict preference over acts:
is a weak order satisfying axiom S4,
(ii) S and X have at least three elements,
, where x > P y > P z for some x, y, z ∈ X,
Then, there cannot exist three pairwise disjoint nonnull events A, B, C such that
Proposition 2 means that, as soon as some acts are neither constant nor binary, the likely dominance rule is compatible with axioms S1 and S4 only for uncertainty orderings such that
The proof precisely shows that the conditions in Proposition 2 may create cycles in preferences. Axiom N has been introduced by Friedman and Halpern [1996] and Dubois and Prade [1995b] in connection with the nonmonotonic logic framework of Kraus et al. [1990] . It means that if C > L A, the likelihood of C is much higher than the likelihood of A. Indeed the likelihood of events can never be attained by lumping events of lower plausibility. So C > L A means that the likelihood of A is negligible in front of the likelihood of C. This result considerably restricts the applicability of the likely dominance rule in Savage's [1972] framework. Indeed, probability measures almost always violate property N. More precisely, we can prove the following result:
comparative probability on S such that axiom N holds, then if S has more than two nonimpossible elements:
Propositions 2 and 3 trivialize the likely dominance rule in Savage's [1972] framework since it enforces the likelihood relation to be a comparative probability satisfying axiom N, when there are at least three states and three consequences. Proposition 3 claims that the likely dominance rule forbids a Savagean decision maker to believe that there are two equally likely states of the world, each of which is more likely than a third state. This is clearly not acceptable in practice. If we analyze the reason why this phenomenon occurs, it is easy to see that axiom S1 plays the crucial role, insofar as we wish to keep the sure-thing principle. S1 assumes the full transitivity of the likelihood relation ≥ L . Giving up the transitivity of ≥ L may relax the unnatural restriction of an almost total ordering of states.
When |X | < 3 or if there are no consequences such that fx > fy > fz, the likely dominance rule cannot generate intransitivities on X S . If X has only two elements x > P y, then the set of acts is truly isomorphic to the set of events and the likely dominance rule then follows from S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5. Indeed, for any act f consider the event A f ⊆ S, where A f is defined as follows:
In particular, for binary acts, the likely dominance rule yields the same preference ordering as expected utility. Indeed, if u is a utility function on X and Prob a probability measure on S, it is obvious that, given f = xAy and g = xBy, When |X | ≥ 3, the trivialization result in Proposition 3 does not rule out all probabilistic representations. The search for probability functions satisfying axiom N has been carried out by Snow [1994 Snow [ , 1999 and Benferhat et al. [1999] . They are very special probability functions such that ∀A ⊆ S, ∃ s ∈ A, Prob({s}) > Prob(A\{s}) 1 so that, for disjoint sets A, B, Prob(A) ≥ Prob(B) if and only if max s∈A Prob(s) ≥ max s∈B Prob(s) (this is due to Proposition 3): the magnitude of p(s) can never be attained by summing the probabilities of states that are individually less probable than s.
. , s n of nonzero probability. Benferhat et al. [1999] called these probability functions big-stepped probabilities. They form what Snow [1994] called an atomic-bound system. Clearly a lot of probability measures are ruled out by this condition.
An Ordinal Axiomatic Framework for Decision Making Under Uncertainty
We now use a relaxed Savage-like framework that tries to overcome the above trivialization result. In view of this result, the only way of accommodating the likely dominance rule while retaining most of Savage's [1972] framework is to weaken postulate S1. The lack of transitivity of the strict preference is not acceptable. But it is possible to modify S1 and drop the transitivity of indifference between acts. Although we shall have to give up probabilistic representations of uncertainty for the most part, such a relaxation improves the consistency between the surething principle and the likely dominance rule. However, is this decision rule the only one that ensures a separate treatment of uncertainty and preference and avoids making them comparable? To address this question, we shall add an axiom precisely expressing this noncomparability requirement. We show that this axiom indeed enforces the likely dominance rule. 4.1. A RELAXED SAVAGE FRAMEWORK. We shall start from a strict preference relation > on the set of acts X S and assume the following property, a weak form of S1:
is a transitive, irreflexive, partially ordered set.
Let ≥ denote the transposed complement of >. Because the strict preference > among acts is irreflexive and transitive, it is obvious that the weak preference ≥ is reflexive and complete (since it cannot hold that f > g and g > f ). Moreover, denote f ∼ g when f ≥ g and g ≥ f , and call it the indifference relation. It is obvious that ∼ is reflexive and symmetric. The following weak transitivity properties hold: f > g and g ∼ h ⇒ f ≥ h and f ∼ g and g > h ⇒ f ≥ h. Indeed, for instance, f > g and h > f imply h > g (transitivity of >) and this is inconsistent with g ∼ h. However, none of ≥ , ∼ is supposed to be transitive. This framework differs from Lehmann's [1996] , who assumed that the weak preference ≥ is not complete but the indifference is transitive.
The lack of transitivity of the indifference relation is not counterintuitive. If f ∼ g is interpreted as " f is close to g" in the sense that their utilities are close (|u( f ) − u(g)| ≤ c), then the lack of transitivity is expected. This is usually the case in preference modeling for multiple-criteria analysis [Roubens and Vincke 1985] . One could alternatively interpret f ∼ g as " f and g are not comparable." However, since relation ≥ is complete, the present framework does not allow one to distinguish between genuine indifference and genuine incomparability. The latter more naturally means that neither f ≥ g nor g ≥ f holds, a case ruled out by our assumptions here. In our framework, indifference is equivalent to when neither f > g nor g > f holds. Treating indifference and noncomparability as distinct situations requires a weak preference ≥ that is not complete.
Let us derive the preference relation ≥ P from ≥ according to Definition 5. Note that Definition 5 applies to whatever preference relation among acts, so that given such a relation, the set X is automatically equipped with a preference relation having at least the same properties as the preference relation on acts it is induced from. The strict part of ≥ P (respectively ≥ L ) is denoted > P (respectively > L ) and the associated indifference ∼ P (respectively ∼ L ). Due to WS1, it is obvious that > P is irreflexive and transitive and that ≥ P is reflexive and complete.
Dropping the transitivity of ≥ cancels some useful consequences of the surething principle under S1, which are nevertheless consistent with the likely dominance rule. Typically, WSTP (or equivalently, the unanimity axiom U) will not derive from the relaxed framework. We shall have to add it so as to keep it. Another very natural property implied by Savage's [1972] framework is that f ≥ P g and g > h implies f > h (where f ≥ P g means that whatever s, f (s) ≥ P g(s)). Similarly, f > g and g ≥ P h implies f > h. This form of transitivity, which could be called "Pareto stability," sounds also very natural, but is not required in the above setting. However, the additional axiom of the next section obviates the need for assuming Pareto stability, up to a pathological case, as seen further on.
At this point, and in order to stick as closely as possible to the classical framework, it is natural to assume WS1, WSTP, S2, S3, S4, and S5 hold.
THE ORDINAL INVARIANCE AXIOM.
Basically, an ordinal description of preference presupposes that preference values are taken from an ordinal scale and are attached to each consequence x ∈ X . It means that the inference drawn from such a representation should be invariant if is changed into φ( ) = {φ(λ): λ ∈ } for any nondecreasing bijection φ of to itself. Here, we shall not use a preference scale explicitly. All that is needed is the finite set X of consequences, equipped with a preference relation ≥ P . Intuitively we shall require the following: if, in each state, the preference pattern between the consequence of act f and the consequence of act g is not altered when changing g and f into f and g then the preference pattern between f and g should remain the same as the one between f and g .
More rigorously, two pairs of acts ( f, g) and ( f , g ) will be called statewise order-equivalent if and only if ∀s ∈ S, f (s) ≥ P g(s) if and only if f (s) ≥ P g (s). This is denoted ( f, g) ≡ ( f , g ). The following ordinal invariance (OI) axiom [Fargier and Perny 1999] fully embodies our requirement of a purely ordinal approach to DMU:
This axiom does express that what matters for preference between two acts is the relative positions of consequences of acts for each state, not the consequences themselves, nor the positions of these acts relative to other acts. If ( f, g) ≡ ( f , g ), then for each state s there is an order-preserving mapping
It is easy to check that the likely dominance rule obeys axiom OI. This is obvious
In the following, the consequence of adding OI to the relaxed Savage-like framework is laid bare. As it turns out, the presence of OI makes the explicit statement of the sure-thing principle and of axiom S4 superfluous.
PROPOSITION 4. Under assumptions that OI holds and that relation ≥ on acts is reflexive, it follows that S2 and S4 hold too.
For S2, one has to see that ( fAh, gAh) ≡ ( fAh , gAh ). For S4, if x > P y and x > P y then (xAy, xBy) ≡ (x Ay , x By ). The role of S3 is to ensure that x ≥ P y if and only if xAf ≥ yAf. It must be kept since it is not true that ( fx, fy) ≡ (xAh, yAh), for any act h, consequences x, y, and event A.
Note that axiom OI always holds when |X | = 2 since, in that case, ( f, g) ≡ ( f , g ) and f = g imply f = f and g = g. Hence the ordinal invariance assumption makes a difference only if |X | ≥ 3 and ∃ x, y, z, x > P y > P z. Moreover, if |X | = 2, the transitivity of ≥ P is trivially satisfied. In fact, if |X | = 2, all nonconstant acts are binary, and the ordinal setting coincides with the Savage [1972] setting, since the likely dominance rule produces the same ordering of acts as the expected utility, in that case, as pointed out in the previous section. Hence we may have to strengthen the nontriviality axiom S5 into Axiom S 5. ∃ fx, fy, fz three constant acts such that fx > fy > fz, in order to focus on the specific features of the decision rule induced by axiom OI. In view of the above discussion, motivated by a purely ordinal approach, we propose to adopt the following axiomatic framework that is faithful to Savage's as much as possible: WS1, WSTP (or U), S3, S5, and OI. In the following, this is called the ordinal decision setting.
This framework (in fact, not all axioms are needed) actually enforces the likely dominance rule as the only rational decision rule [Fargier and Perny 1999 The proof relies on the statewise order-equivalence between the pairs of acts ( f, g) and
The assumptions of Proposition 5 are clearly verified under axiom WS1. As a consequence, if one insists on sticking to a purely ordinal view of DMU, and one adopts the very weakly constrained framework defined by WS1, WSTP (or U), S3, and S 5, then ordinal invariance, embodied by axiom OI, enforces the likely dominance rule. There is thus no alternative to this decision rule in a purely ordinal setting.
It remains to check the type of uncertainty representation this framework leads to, as it was proved to be almost contradictory with a standard probabilistic representation. This is the topic of the next section.
Subjective Comparative Likelihood Induced by the Ordinal Setting
In this section we first consider the weak Savage setting defined by postulates WS1, S2, S3, S4, S5, and WSTP (or unanimity). In Section 5.1, we first study the properties of the likelihood relations > L , ≥ L , and ∼ L induced via S4 without assuming OI. In that case, the setting is more general than Savage's (but it is finite), since we do not assume the transitivity of the weak preference. In Section 5.2, we add the OI axiom, and the framework then moves away from comparative probability. In Section 5.3, it is shown that we get much closer to nonmonotonic reasoning based on preferential inference. 5.1. WITHOUT ORDINAL INVARIANCE. Suppose we keep the five basic axioms of Savage's [1972] framework, just relaxing S1 into WS1. We call this framework the quasitransitive Savage setting. We first prove properties that hold without even assuming unanimity (U or WSTP).
PROPOSITION 6. In the quasitransitive Savage setting, the subjective likelihood relation > L induced by S4 verifies the following properties:
characterization of null events).
These properties are satisfied by comparative probability, of course. The preadditivity property is driven by the sure-thing principle and it implies that
Moreover, autoduality and inclusion monotony are derived from the other properties (noncontradiction, nontriviality, preadditivity) of > L . However, the weak comparative likelihood ≥ L is not transitive and transitivity is not even preserved when ≥ L is composed with its strict part :
In order to recover these properties, what is needed is the weak sure-thing principle WSTP or the unanimity rule U equivalently. Remember, they do hold in Savage's framework due to S1, and have to be added here since the weak preference is not transitive. This new setting, called the quasitransitive Savage setting with unanimity, remains weaker than Savage's, but the situation then slightly improves due to the following property: PROPOSITION 7. In the quasitransitive Savage setting with unanimity: if (A∪B)
4) -There is at least one nonnull state.
(7.5)
Hence, the unanimity axiom, added to WS1, S2, S3, S4, and S5, ensures that the null events form a class closed under union (Proposition 7.1) and intersection (last item of Proposition 6) since ∼ L becomes transitive for null events. So there exists a largest null set, say NULL, such that any set of states A is null if and only if it is a subset of NULL. It also means that under this weakened Savage framework it is always possible to assume that no state is null without any loss of information: if we delete all null states from S as being impossible, a state space where no nonempty set is null is obtained. 
CONSEQUENCES OF ORDINAL INVARIANCE.
Let us now add OI to our set of axioms characterizing the preference on acts. This is called the ordinal decision setting, defined by axioms WS1, S3, S 5, OI, and WSTP (or U). We know that axioms S2 and S4 need no longer be stated explicitly. Under these conditions we can show the following: PROPOSITION 8. In the ordinal decision setting, if S contains at least two nonnull states, the preference on X is a weak order (but the ordering of states in S may be partial).
The proof only uses WS1 and OI. The above proposition leads us to consider the quotient set X/∼ P using the equivalence relation associated to the consequence preordering ≥ P . It provides a utility scale. It makes sense to cluster equivalent consequences and replace X by X/∼ P . For instance if X/∼ P has only two elements, then the set of acts is truly isomorphic to the set of events and the likely dominance rule then follows from the quasitransitive Savage setting as pointed out in Section 3.2.
If there is only one nonnull state s * ∈ S such that s * > L Ø, then f > g if and only if ( f > g) {s * } . Hence we can then assume that S reduces to a singleton, that is, the state is known. This is the case when the agent acts as if the knowledge about the world were deterministic. Then the likelihood relation ≥ L is transitive, since for any event A ∼ L S or A ∼ L Ø. Axiom S3 leads to f > g if and only if f (s * ) > P g(s * ). Hence the set of acts and the set of consequences coincide. If there is only one nonnull state s * ∈ S, axioms S2, S4, and U are trivially satisfied, as well as the OI axiom since f > g if and only if s * ∈ [ f > P g] . However, Proposition 8 may fail to hold when there is only one nonnull state and X has more than three nonindifferent elements because the properties of the ordering on X reflect the properties of the ordering on acts.
Another important consequence of ordinal invariance OI is a fully coherent behavior of the strict likelihood relation > L with respect to set inclusion, because it respect the orderly property of Halpern [1997] : PROPOSITION 9. In the ordinal decision setting, the likelihood relation is orderly, that is:
However the presence of the ordinal invariance axiom leads us away from comparative probability, since the following very strong, nonprobabilistic property, already encountered in Section 3, and denoted as axiom N, holds for the comparative likelihood: PROPOSITION 10. In the ordinal decision setting, if A, B, and
This is a variant of Proposition 2, whose proof is based on OI and does not require from axiom S1 more than the transitivity of the strict part of the preordering ≥ on events and thus applies here. Unanimity is not needed either.
However Propositions 9 and 10 generally do not hold when X has only two nonindifferent elements x > P y, (i.e., when S 5 does not hold), and there are at least two nonnull states.
2 In that case, the consequences belong to two different equivalence classes, because of Proposition 8 (indeed, WS1, S3, OI, and S5 imply that the preference relation on the consequences is a weak order). Because of S4, acts and events coincide, and the likely dominance rule is a consequence of S2 and S4. In this case, the preference on acts can be a weak order, as in Savage setting. We thus get a theory of uncertainty that satisfies Proposition 6 and, if unanimity is required, Propositions 7 and 8. But Propositions 9 and 10 can be violated.
Violations of Proposition 9 when X = {x, y} and x > P y are easy to find:
. It violates no property induced by the ordinal decision setting, except Proposition 9. So the case of binary consequence sets is pathological. Proposition 9 directly follows from Pareto stability of the strict preference over acts, that is " f ≥ P g and g > h implies f > h," and f > g and "g ≥ P h implies f > h." Hence Proposition 9 is recovered even if X = {x, y}, when Pareto stability is added to WS1, S2, S3, S4, S5, and U. In fact, Pareto stability 2 Indeed, if there is only one nonnull state, say s 
Hence, in this case, Proposition 9 still holds, provided that the system obeys S5. Concerning Proposition 10 :
Hence, in this case Proposition 10 still holds, provided that the system obeys S5. is a consequence of Savage's framework and it must be added in its nontransitive relaxation using WS1.
Proposition 10 cannot be deduced in Savage's [1972] framework: counterexamples are easy to find when > L is supposed to come from a probability distribution.
SAVAGE AXIOMS, ORDINAL INVARIANCE, AND PREFERENTIAL INFERENCE.
Property N and the orderly property of Proposition 9 are closely related to one of the characteristic properties for uncertainty relations that Friedman and Halpern [1996] called "plausibility" relations, which are closely connected to nonmonotonic consequence relations. Given a subjective likelihood relation > L , define an inference relation as follows:
A → B intuitively means that B is more likely than not when A is true. This section gives a self-contained proof that the uncertainty theory induced by the relaxed Savage framework augmented with the OI axiom generates a full-fledged nonmonotonic inference, thus giving decision-theoretic foundations to nonmonotonic reasoning. Of course, this is no longer surprising due to Proposition 10 and Friedman and Halpern's [1996] results. Our presentation makes it clear which properties of nonmonotonic consequences are related to which Savage-like axioms.
A conditional assertion is an expression of the form ϕ → ψ, where ϕ and ψ are propositional formulas and → is an inference relation. In the following we shall never use formulas, but only sets of models thereof, and consider nonmonotonic inferences of the form A → B. It means that if all that is known by an agent is that event A obtains, then the agent will reason as if B obtained as well. In other words, in context A, the agent accepts B. Basic properties of nonmonotonic inference have been advocated by Kraus et al. [1990] , and form what is known as "system P":
R:
A The above rules of inference embody the notion of plausible inference in the presence of incomplete information. Namely, they describe the properties of deduction under the assumption that the state of the world is as normal as can be. The crucial rules are cautious monotony and the cut. Cautious monotony claims that if A holds, and if the normal course of things is that B and C hold in this situation, then knowing that B and A hold should not lead us to situations that are exceptional for A: C should still normally hold. The cut is the converse rule: if C usually holds in the presence of A and B then, if situations where A and B hold are normal ones among those where A holds (so that A normally entails B), one should take it for granted that A normally entails C as well. The other above properties are not specific to plausible inference: OR enables disjunctive information to be handled without resorting to cases. The right weakening rule, when combined with the right AND, just ensures that the set of nonmonotonic consequences {B, A∩ B > L A∩ B c } (the set of propositions "accepted" by > L when A is true) is deductively closed in every context (see Dubois and Prade [1995b] ; ). Reflexivity sounds natural but can be challenged for null events, as seen below.
These basic properties can be used to form the syntactic inference rules of a logic of plausible inference. There exist six semantics that have been proposed for such a logic: preferential semantics (Kraus et al. [1990] ), based on a partial ordering relation on an abstract set, projected to the set S via a mapping (it has little intuitive appeal); three-valued logic semantics based on an abstraction of conditional probabilities (Dubois and Prade [1994] ); infinitesimal probabilistic semantics (Adams [1975] ; Pearl [1988] ; Lehmann and Magidor [1992] ); possibilistic semantics (Dubois and Prade [1995a] ), whereby a set of conditional assertions is equivalent to a family of possibility orderings; finitistic probabilistic semantics by means of a very special class of probability measures, the one encountered in Section 3 (Benferhat et al. [1999] ); and a last semantics (Friedman and Halpern [1996] ), based on partial orderings of events satisfying property N.
The above natural properties of these inference relations, for the purpose of reasoning tolerant to exceptions proposed by Kraus et al. [1990] can be translated as follows:
Property R does not hold in the setting of likelihood relations. In system P, the reflexivity property A → A reads ∀A, A > L Ø in our setting. This axiom fails due to the presence of null events. Moreover it implies Ø > L Ø, which is also wrong since > L is irreflexive. This is not so important at the technical level for getting representation results, as shown in Benferhat et al. [1997] . Moreover, it is not clear that A → A makes sense when reasoning under exceptions, when A = Ø: one may admit that a contradiction preferentially infers nothing. Reflexivity can be replaced by two conditions conjointly (Benferhat et al. [1997] ): -restricted reflexivity: ∀A = Ø, A → A, that is, A > L Ø; -consistency preservation: ¬(A → Ø), which expresses that Ø > L A holds for no event A, a property that relation > L satisfies.
Since the set of null events has a maximal element NULL for inclusion and every subset of NULL is null, system P with restricted reflexivity and consistency preservation is satisfied on S\NULL. Null events can be defined directly in system P by just dropping the restricted reflexivity axiom and calling an event A null whenever A → A does not hold. Using right weakening and OR, it is clear that A → A and B → B imply A ∪ B → A ∪ B. Hence if A → A does not hold then ∀B ⊆ A, B → B does not hold either. So there will always be a maximal event NULL such that reflexivity holds except for subsets of NULL.
The other properties of system P are induced by the ordinal decision setting on the inference relation based on subjective likelihood:
PROPOSITION 11. OR and AND follow from (WS1, S3, S 5, and OI).
At this point of our axiomatization, we cannot get all the properties of system P, but only some of them. In order to prove RW, CUT, and CM, we need the following properties:
which cannot be derived without the unanimity axiom.
3 The next proposition holds if this axiom is valid:
PROPOSITION 12. If the relation on X S satisfies the axioms of the ordinal decision setting, then the nonmonotonic inference built from the relation projected from X S to 2 S satisfies the following properties of system P: OR, AND, RW, CM, CUT.
This result establishes a bridge between decision theory and nonmonotonic reasoning. It also show the similarity of spirit between the axiomatic approaches of Savage [1972] and Lehmann and colleagues (Kraus et al. [1990] ; Lehmann and Magidor [1992] ).
Ordinal Invariance Enforces Qualitative Possibility Theory
A nontrivial example of a subjective likelihood relation that fits decision theory based on ordinal invariance can be provided in the setting of qualitative possibility theory (Lewis [1973] ; Dubois [1986] ; ).
6.1. QUALITATIVE POSSIBILITY THEORY. Assume that a decision maker supplies a weak order of states ≥ π on S, describing their relative plausibility. This relation is called a comparative possibility distribution. Intuitively s ≥ π s means that state s is at least as plausible, normal, and expected as state s . The simplicity of possibility theory stems from the fact that it uses weak orderings of events completely characterized by their comparative possibility distribution. Namely, a pair of dual possibility and necessity orderings on events can be generated on events, from a weak order ≥ π on states only. Namely, denoting max ( This lifting rule must be completed by the property {s} ≥ Ø for all s ∈ S. If we enforce the property {s} > Ø, for all states, the obtained possibility ordering on events is called nondogmatic as it does not rule out any state in an absolute manner. Of course there are other ways of lifting weak ordering relations from elements to subsets that are less intuitive here, for instance, changing max into min (see ). Halpern [1997] has studied in detail the process of lifting a plausibility relation from elements of a set to its subsets, assuming only a partial ordering of states. See Appendix A for the axiomatic definitions of possibility and necessity orderings and their set-function representations.
The main idea behind this modeling is that the state of the world is always believed to be as normal as possible, neglecting less normal states. Thus B ≥ C means that there is a normal state where B holds that is at least as normal as any normal state where C holds. B ≥ C also means that B is at least as plausible as C where plausibility refers to consistency with an agent's knowledge: B is plausible when it does not contradict the agent's beliefs described by the comparative plausibility distribution. The dual ordering B ≥ N C is intuitively understood as "B is at least as certain as C," in the sense that all situations where B fails to hold are less normal than the most normal situation where C does not hold. In particular, the events accepted as true are those which hold in all the most plausible situations.
Note that as soon as A ∩ B ≥ A c ∩ B and A ∩ B ≥ A ∩ B c , events A and B are of equal possibility. To overcome this lack of discrimination, consider the following comparative likelihood relation between events:
where ≥ is the possibility ordering on events induced by ≥ π .
This relation has been proposed independently by various authors like Brewka [1989] , Brass [1991] , Cayrol et al. [1992] , Geffner [1992] , and Delgrande [1994] , mainly for the purpose of ordering subsets of formulas from a prioritized knowledge base, in the scope of nonmonotonic reasoning and inconsistency management. Here it is used as a tool to define a comparative likelihood relation among events.
Note that > and > L coincide when restricting to mutually exclusive events A and B since then 
. This is because, even if is two-valued, max(π 5 , π 3 ) = max(π 4 , π 6 ) and max(π 2 , π 6 ) = max(π 3 , π 7 ) do not imply max(π 4 , π 7 ) = max(π 2 , π 5 ) denoting
Finally, the preadditivity condition (iv) of comparative probabilities holds, and the relation ≥ L turns out to be self-dual:
So, the relation ≥ L possesses all properties of a comparative likelihood induced by the ordinal decision setting. It is similar to a comparative probability, except for the transitivity of indifference. Because of the lack of transitivity of the indifference relation, we cannot generally represent such relations by means of probability measures, nor can we assume properties that are usually derived from comparative probabilities. For instance, the following property of comparative probability is not satisfied in general by possibilistic likelihood:
Counterexample.
POSSIBILISTIC LIKELIHOOD AS A MODEL OF SUBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY IN THE ORDINAL DECISION SETTING.
It is easy to verify that possibilistic likelihood is a model of subjective likelihood consistent with our ordinal decision setting. Assume that a decision maker supplies a weak order of states in the form of a possibility distribution π on S and a weak order of consequences ≥ P on X . Let > be the induced possibilistic ordering of events. Let > L denote the associated possibilistic likelihood relation (*). The two relations coincide for disjoint sets. Define the preference on acts in accordance with the likely dominance rule, that is, for any two acts f and g:
The OI axiom holds for this preference relation, by construction. In the following we prove that the obtained preference on acts also satisfies the other axioms of the ordinal decision setting (WS1, S3, S 5, U, OI). To do it, we shall use the properties of the possibility ordering of events (Definition A1 in Appendix A). First we show that the notions of constant acts, null events, and conditional preference are well defined. PROPOSITION 14.
-∀x, y ∈ X, fx ≥ fy iff x ≥ P y (14.1) Hence all properties of the ordinal decision setting are satisfied when the preference on acts derives from a possibility distribution on S and a weak ordering on X .
Example 1 (continued). Consider again the three-state/three-consequence example of Section 3. If a uniform probability is changed into a uniform possibility distribution, then it is easy to check that the likely dominance rule yields f ∼ g ∼ h.
So f > g > h follows. It contrasts with the cycles obtained with a probabilistic approach.
The lack of transitivity of the indifference relation can be observed in very simple cases, where only three states and two consequences are used:
Counterexample for the transitivity of ∼ for acts. Consider again the three-state example of Section 3, with a uniform possibility distribution. Suppose
One can verify that
6.3. REPRESENTATION RESULTS. Possibility theory is closely related to preferential inference in nonmonotonic reasoning, as defined by Kraus et al. [1990] . Indeed, they called rankings what we call comparative possibility distributions. Assume no null events. Then, Dubois and Prade [1995a] 
To encompass null events, it is enough to extend these possibility orderings so that whatever Y null, Y ∼ Ø. Indeed, the set of null events is the family subsets of NULL. In terms of possibility distributions, a possibility distribution assigns degree 0 to each null state.
Since > L is an autodual additive relation, the ordering between nondisjoint events is completely defined by the ordering between disjoint events. Hence Proposition 16 holds for any pair of events X, Y without restricting to disjoint events. Overall, putting together the results obtained so far and the ones of Dubois and Prade [1995a] on the possibilistic representation of the nonmonotonic system P, one gets the bridge between the ordinal decision making framework and possibility theory: THEOREM 1. If a partially ordered set of acts (X S , ≥ ) satisfies the axioms of the ordinal decision setting, then there is a family F of possibility orderings on S and a relation
Generally, relation ≥ P is a weak order unless there is only one nonnull state.
PROOF. Suppose two nonnull states at least. As a consequence of Proposition 8 we know that the projection of (X S , ≥) on X is a weak order. Let us denote by ≥ P this weak order.
From Proposition 15 we also know that the projection (X S , ≥ ) on the disjoint events of S defines a family of possibility orderings such that X > L Y if and only if ∀ > ∈F, X > Y where X and Y are disjoint. With
When there is only one nonnull state, the theorem obviously holds since the likelihood relation reduces to a single, very particular possibility ordering.
So, starting from a general framework on acts that respects Savage's [1972] approach to a large extent, we find a likelihood relation which can be represented by a family of possibility orderings, since the preferential entailment of system P can always be represented in terms of such a family. Notice in particular that the relation on states obtained from our axiomatic framework is not necessarily a weak order, so that it cannot always be represented by a single possibility ordering. However, given any family F of possibility orderings, it is routine to check that the induced likely dominance decision rule such that
does satisfy Propositions 14 and 15. All above proofs for a single possibility distribution straightforwardly extend to the families thereof. Hence Theorem 1 can be strengthened into a genuine representation theorem:
THEOREM 2. A partially ordered set of acts (X S , ≥) satisfies the axioms of the ordinal decision setting, if and only if there is a family F of possibility orderings on S and a relation
In order to get a unique possibilistic likelihood relation as the representation of uncertainty, first recall that the nonmonotonic inference which expresses that A ∩ B > A ∩ B c for one possibility ordering > coincides with the so-called "rational" inference of Lehmann [Lehmann and Magidor 1992] , that is, an inference relation which satisfies rational monotony [Benferhat et al. 1997 
]:
Rational monotony: A → C and not A → B c imply A ∩ B → C.
In the above, "not A → B c " means that it is not the case that B generally does not hold in situations where A holds. Indeed, if B c is expected, then A ∩ B might well be an exceptional A-situation, where C is no longer normal. In terms of the subjective likelihood relation this axiom reads as follows:
Adding the RM axiom to system P forces the relation on states to be a weak order, thus corresponding to a single possibilistic ordering as proved in Benferhat et al. [1997] . However, it is not easy to express RM in terms of acts in a nontrivial way. The proof of CM in Proposition 12 could be mimicked assuming
However this axiom is equivalent to requiring the transitivity of ≥ on acts. It makes the system collapse to the usual Savage setting and then leads to special orderings on S such as described in Proposition 3. It thus captures only very special possibility orderings. Decision axioms for deriving unique general comparative possibility orderings are under study [Dubois et al. 2002] .
To summarize this section, we have proved that, in the presence of the ordinal invariance assumption, the only underlying "rational" subjective theory of uncertainty can be expressed in terms of possibilistic likelihood relations. Then the uncertainty on states must be represented by one or several possibility distributions instead of a probability distribution. By adopting an ordinal invariance assumption, we rule out additive numerical representations. Moreover, it leads to a unique decision rule that reconstructs the ordering on acts from the uncertainty on events and the preference relation on consequences: the likely dominance rule, whose expressiveness turns out to be limited as shown now.
What is the Behavior of the Ordinal Decision Maker Under Uncertainty?
Let us study the likely dominance rule induced by a single possibility distribution (i.e., the possibilistic likelihood relation it induces). It is clear that when the subjective likelihood relation derives from several possibility distributions, it only produces more reasons for incomparability between acts. So the case of a single possibility distribution is the most favorable for the likely dominance rule to be decisive.
If the decision maker is ignorant about the state of the world, all states are equipossible, and all events but Ø are equally possible as well. Possibilistic likelihood then coincides with set-inclusion. Namely, A > L B if and only if B ⊂ A. So, if f and g are such that [g > P f ] = Ø and [ f > P g] = Ø hold, then none of f > g and g > f hold as per the likely dominance rule, since such events are always disjoint. Then X S is partially ordered only via Pareto dominance in the sense of ≥ P . That is:
This method, although totally sound, is not decisive at all (it corresponds to the unanimity rule in voting theory).
Conversely, if there is an ordering s 1 , . . . ,
Moreover, this is a lexicographic ranking:
It corresponds to the procedure: check if f is better than g in the most normal state; if yes prefer f ; if f and g give equally preferred results in s 1 , check in the second most normal state, and so on recursively. This comes down to a lexicographic ranking of vectors ( f (s 1 ), . . . , f (s n )) and (g(s 1 ), . . . , g(s n )). It is a form of dictatorship by most plausible states, in voting theory terms.
More generally any weak order splits S into a well-ordered partition
, such that states in each S i are equally plausible and states in S i are more plausible than states in S j , ∀ j > i. In that case the ordering of events is defined as follows: A > L B if and only if min{i:
c }, and the ordering of acts is defined by -f > g if and only if ∃k ≥ 1 such that:
, and
Informally, the decision maker proceeds as follows: f and g are compared on the set of most normal states (S 1 ): if f performs better than g in each s ∈ S 1 , then f is preferred to g; if there is a disagreement in S 1 about the relative performance of f and g then f and g are indifferent. If f and g have equally preferred consequences in each most normal state then the decision maker considers the set of second most normal states S 2 , etc. In other words, the decision maker applies a unanimity rule on the most plausible states, and a prioritized (lexicographic) procedure when a situation of indifference between acts is met: the next most plausible states are used to break ties. In a nutshell, it is a prioritized Pareto dominance relation.
This behavior contrasts, although a clear similarity exists, with Lehmann's [1996] approach, which keeps the prioritized procedure across unequally plausible states (implausible states are neglected) and recommends a standard expected utility rule among the equally plausible ones. Moreover, it is striking to notice the similarity between the decision rules displayed above, which require Pareto dominance of best acts over the most plausible states, and voting procedures found in social choice (Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein [1972] ; Weymark [1984] ; see also Sen [1986] ) by relaxing the transitivity of the social preference and assuming the transitivity of its strict part. They do find that decisions should be made unanimously by an oligarchy of voters (here, the most plausible states), but they do not insist on the prioritized sequence of oligarchies.
Example 2. Consider the omelet example of Savage ([1972] , pp. 13 to 15) recalled in Table I . The problem is how to make a six-egg omelet from a five-egg Nothing to eat (1) Break it apart in a cup BAC A 6-egg omelet, a cup to wash (5) A 5-egg omelet, a cup to wash (3) Throw it away TA A 5-egg omelet, one spoiled egg (2) A 5-egg omelet (4) one. The new egg can be fresh or rotten. There are three feasible acts: break the egg in the omelet (BIO); break it apart in a cup (BAC); or throw it away (TA). The set of six consequences is given in Table I . Integers between parentheses indicate the intuitive ordering of consequences, and the greater the number the higher the preference. Since only two states are present, the ordering of events can always be represented by only one possibility ordering. Let us apply the likely dominance rule. If a fresh egg is more likely than rotten a egg, then
and the best act is clearly BIO. If the decision maker thinks the egg is rotten, then the best act is TA. In case of total ignorance, the three acts are indifferent. So the decision-making attitude induced by the approach is: break the egg in the omelet if you think the egg is fresh, throw it away if you think it is rotten, and do anything you like if you have no opinion (all acts equally preferred then). Clearly, this may result in many starving days, and garbage cans filled with lots of spoiled fresh eggs, in the case when the state of the egg is usually hard to tell. Of course the extreme peculiarity of this example masks the richness of possible blends between unanimity and dictatorship occurring in the case of more than two states, when a single possibility ordering is involved.
It is interesting to compare the ranking of acts obtained above on the egg example with the one obtained using the pessimistic possibilistic utility proposed in Dubois and Prade [1995c] . This criterion presupposes that utilities and degrees of necessity belong to the same totally ordered scale, here L = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, equipped with its order-reversing map n. The pessimistic utility of an act f when the knowledge of the state is given by an L-valued possibility distribution π: S → L and the utility of consequence given by an L-valued utility u: X → L, is expressed as
where N is a necessity function (see Apendix A).
This utility is a mild extension of the pessimistic maximin decision rule (which rates an act on the basis of its least preferred consequence) advocated and axiomatized by Brafman and Tennenholtz [2000] in terms of conditional policies (rather an acts). See Dubois et al. [2001b] for the act-driven axiomatization of u * ( f ).
The utilities of the three acts in the egg example are then given as a function of states F and R: u * (BIO) = min(max(N (R), 6), max(N (F), 1)) = max(N (F), 1), u * (BAC) = min(max(N (R), 5), max(N (F), 3)), u * (TA) = min(max(N (R), 2), max(N (F), 4)). Table II exhibits the best acts as a function of the decision maker's knowledge about the egg. The model recommends act BAC in case of relative ignorance about the egg state, that is, when max(N (F), N (R)) is not high enough (less than 3). In practice, it is indeed advisable to act cautiously, and to break the egg in a spare cup in case of serious doubt. The pessimistic possibilistic criterion seems to deliver a more realistic advice than the one prescribed by the likely dominance rule, which does not presuppose commensurability between uncertainty and utility.
Other decision rules proposed in the literature could benefit from the above study. For instance Boutilier [1994] compared acts on the basis of the worst (or the best) consequences in the set of most plausible states. This decision rule lacks discrimination power. It can be made more discriminating by allowing ties to be broken by checking the second most plausible states, and so on like for the likely dominance rule. The above possibilistic decision rule and the maximin rule can consider two acts as indifferent while one Pareto dominates the other. Of course, the acts are then totally preordered. On the contrary, the likely dominance rule respects the Pareto dominance, but it may lead to incomparabilities that can sometimes be solved using a maximin rule. This complementarity suggests a combination of ideas of prioritization and respect of Pareto dominance stemming from our study and the maximin rule. The maximin rule can be forced to respect Pareto dominance by comparing acts f and g on the basis of their worst discriminating consequences
. This decision rule was proposed and axiomatized by Cohen and Jaffray [1980] . Clearly, acts will be only partially ordered using this improved maximin decision rule, but this partial ordering refines the maximin rule. Again one may apply this rule in a prioritized way: the improved maximin decision rule can be substituted to unanimity within the likely dominance rule inside the oligarchies of states. The Savagean-like framework proposed by Lehmann [1996] also leads to a sequence of oligarchies of states, with a comparative probability inside the oligarchies. No decision rule is proposed but it is easy to imagine a counterpart of the likely dominance rule where expected utility applies inside the oligarchies of states. However reasonable these refined decision rules may look, they need further work to be formally justified.
Conclusion
This paper suggests that purely symbolic approaches to both rational and practically useful criteria for decision making under uncertainty have serious limitations in terms of expressive power. We have tried to adapt Savage's [1972] decision theory to a purely ordinal setting. The addition of the OI axiom to the relaxed Savage turns out to drastically restrict the type of uncertainty that can represent the decision maker's knowledge about the world, as well as the possible decision rules that can be rationally applied. Despite the presence of well-known Savage axioms, including the sure-thing principle, the admissible uncertainty functions contain only very special kinds of probability functions ("big-stepped probabilities" pointed out in Section 3.2), due to a Condorcet-like [1785] intransitivity effect. By relaxing the weak order assumptions for comparing acts, decision-theoretic foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning based on preferential entailment have been laid bare as a byproduct.
The decision rule obtained from first principles in this way is likely dominance. It is either overconfident by overfocusing on most plausible states, or indecisive because of requiring Pareto dominance of acts on these most plausible states. Since preferential inference is very cautious, the relations on acts which do not correspond to a total likelihood ordering on states will not be very discriminating. On the contrary, if the set of states is totally ordered in terms of plausibility (when the weak preference on acts is transitive), the decisions will be very risky: as usual with nonmonotonic inference, the decision maker must assume that the world is in the most normal state. Cautious decisions will never be preferred. The decision rules obtained by means of a purely ordinal representation of uncertainty and utility have common features with other ones proposed on intuitive grounds in the nonmonotonic reasoning literature (see especially Boutilier [1994] ). They logically recommend sticking to the most plausible states when discriminating between acts, in the tradition of preferential entailment. While being natural when modeling acceptance of statements for the purpose of making inferences about the world, this view may be questioned in the case of making decisions whose results affect the world, and where focusing on a few plausible states may be harmful if very unlikely states have very undesirable consequences.
It is thus difficult to maintain that the decision guidelines offered by the theory developed in this paper are completely reasonable since they reject the most usual decision rules, like expected utility and the maximin criterion. In contrast, the possibilistic extension of the maximin criterion, based on an absolute finite scale for utility and likelihood looks more intuitively satisfactory, as shown in the example of the previous section. However the possibilistic criterion relies on a commensurability assumption between uncertainty and preference, which may be questioned by tenants of a purely symbolic approach, (although it is part of Savage's [1972] framework proper).
The results of this paper are rather negative for decision theory when only ordinal information about uncertainty and preference on consequences is available and no common evaluation scale is assumed for uncertainty and preference. This is not really a surprise for anybody familiar with voting theory and aware of its similarity to DMU (Fargier and Perny [1999] ) emphasized this point). In voting theory, the ordinal setting leads to either complex and rationally debatable procedures, or simple but morally dubious ones, or yet indecisive ones. This paper seems to conclude that there is no alternative to the likely dominance rule that would enable a reasonably cautious albeit decisive ordering on acts to be computed on the single basis of ordering relations on events and consequences, under the constraints induced by the sure-thing principle. In other words, we cannot do away with comparability assumptions between preference and uncertainty, nor avoid numerical approaches if human-like decision attitudes under uncertainty that remain decisive and rational are to be captured. This view is probably too pessimistic. Actually, there might be some unexplored possibilities by weakening axiom OI while avoiding the notion of certainty equivalent of an uncertain act. It must be stressed that OI requires more than the simple ordinal nature of preference and uncertainty (i.e., more than separate ordinal scales for each of them). Condition OI also involves a condition of independence with respect to irrelevant alternatives (in the sense of Arrow [1969] and Sen [1986] ). It says that the preference f ≥ g only depends on the relative positions of quantities f (s) and g(s) on the preference scale. This unnecessary part of the condition could be canceled within the proposed framework, thus leaving room for a new family of rules not considered in this paper, for instance, involving a third act or some prescribed consequence considered as an aspiration level.
Besides, it is noticeable that neither the set of axioms proposed by Savage [1972] nor the ones suggested in this paper contain one that refers to the decision maker attitude toward uncertainty (like in the maximin rule). This may explain why cautious decisions seem to be ignored. Sometimes this is due to overfocusing on plausible states, which tend to assume the decision maker thinks the state of the world is indeed what he/she considers most plausible, while other states may not be so implausible as to justify their being neglected. Sometimes it is due to indecisiveness, when the decision maker has little knowledge of the state, and cautious acts that might be advisable never dominate other ones. In order to explicitly handle the decision maker's level of confidence in front of incomplete information, one might think of reverting the likely dominance rule by exchanging the role of states and consequences. It would lead to expressing the preference between acts in terms of a comparison of sets of consequences instead of sets of states as done here. Since only single consequences are compared by the utility relation, this method presupposes that the preference relation on consequences be itself lifted to a subset of consequences. Then pessimistic and optimistic attitudes can be captured in the sets of axioms, by specifying whether a set of consequences is appraised in terms of best or worst consequence in the set. This is explicitly done when axiomatizing the maximin criterion, or its possibilistic extensions, already mentioned. Future work should also strive toward exploiting the complementarities of prioritized Paretoefficient decision methods as the likely dominance rule, and of the pessimistic decision rules related to the maximin criterion. Last, our results also apply, with minor adaptation, to multicriteria decision making, where the various objectives play the role of the states of nature in DMU [Dubois et al. 2001b] .
Appendix A. Comparative Possibility Relations
The most natural framework for representing uncertainty without numbers is to define a comparative likelihood relation among events, viewed as subsets A, B, C, . . . 
B ≥ N C reads B is at least as necessary (= certain) as C.
Necessity orderings, introduced by Dubois [1986] , coincide with epistemic entrenchment relations in the sense of Gärdenfors [1988] (see Dubois and Prade [1991] ), and possibility orderings have been introduced by Lewis [1973] , then rediscovered by Dubois [1986] , and also studied by Grove [1988] A pair of dual necessity and possibility orderings is particularly simple on finite sets since they both derive from a weak order ≥ π on states only.
Any necessity ordering on a finite set can be represented by a necessity function N [ Dubois and Prade 1988] The comparative possibility distribution ≥ π can be encoded as a possibility distribution π , which is a mapping S → L. Namely, (A) = max s∈A π (s) and
where n is the order-reversing function L → L . In terms of possibility measures [Zadeh 1978 
Appendix B. Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Assume axiom U and fAg ≥ g, gAf ≥ g. Then using S2, fAh ≥ gAh for any h, and h A f ≥ h Ag for any h . The first preference statement reads ( f ≥ g) A , and the second ( f ≥ g) A c , noticing that h A f is the same act as fA c h . Hence f ≥ g by axiom U. Conversely assume ( f ≥ g) A , ( f ≥ g) A c , and WSTP. The two first assumptions mean ∀h, fAh ≥ g Ah and ∀h , h A f ≥ h Ag. Now just specialize these with h = g and h = g and apply WSTP to get f ≥ g.
Consider the three acts f , g, h as follows:
Last, using again the likely dominance rule we find that A ∪ B ≥ L C implies f ≥ g. However since ≥ is a weak order, the strict part of ≥ is transitive so that g > h follows. Contradiction. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. First let us prove that S2 holds, that is, ∀A, f, g, h, h , fAh ≥ gAh if and only if fAh ≥ gAh . It is enough to notice that (fAh, gAh) ≡ (fAh , gAh ). Indeed if s ∈ A then the consequences remain the same; if s ∈ A, then since relation ≥ on acts is reflexive, it holds that h(s) ≥ P h(s) and h (s) ≥ P h (s). Now for S4, a similar reasoning applies. S4 reads ∀x, y, x , y ∈ X s.t. x > P y, x > P y , xAy ≥ xBy iff x Ay ≥ x By . We shall show that (xAy, xBy) ≡ (x Ay , x By ). There are four cases: -s ∈ A ∩ B: xAy(s) = x ≥ P xBy(s) = x and x Ay (s) = x ≥ P x By (s) = x using reflexivity. -s ∈ A c ∩ B: xBy (s) = x > P xAy (s) = y and x By (s) = x > P x By (s) = y .
-s ∈ A ∩ B c : xAy (s) = x > P xBy (s) = y and x By (s) = x > P x By (s) = y .
-s ∈ A c ∩ B c : xAy (s) = y ≥ P xBy (s) = y and x By (s) = y ≥ P x By (s) = y using reflexivity.
Hence S4 holds under OI. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. Note that since OI holds S2 and S4 hold too. Let ≥ P be the restriction of ≥ on X (due to Definition 5) and ≥ L be the projection of ≥ on events (due to S4). If all consequences on X are indifferent then all acts are indifferent and the problem is trivial since [ f > P g] = [g > P f ] = Ø and ≥ P is complete. So, for all acts, f ∼ g and [
Due to S5, there are x, y ∈ X such that x > P y. Under S4 the likely dominance rule also reads f ≥ g iff Choosing f = fx; h = fy; g = fy leads to xAy ≥ yAy = xØy; hence using S4: A ≥ L Ø. Suppose that G ∼ L F and E\G ∼ L Ø. From Proposition 7, we get E ≥ L F (with A = G, B = F, C = E\G, D = Ø). -(7.5): If every state is null, then by (7.1), S is null: contradiction with Proposition 6 (nontriviality).
Compatibility with null events:
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8. By WS1, we know that ≥ is complete and > transitive. We now have to show that the indifference relation ∼ that one can define from ≥ is also transitive on constant acts. If X has only two elements, the problem is trivial. Suppose there are more than two elements. Suppose that x, y, and z are three elements of X s.t. x ∼ P y, y ∼ P z, and x > P z. Suppose that at least two states of S are not null states. Hence, assuming x ∼ P y, y ∼ P z, and x > P z leads to g > h, h > k, g ∼ k, which is in contradiction with the transitivity of >. Hence, ∼ P is transitive on X.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9. Let x, y, z ∈ X be such that x > P y > P z. Suppose first that A, B, C are disjoint.
-(9.1): Suppose A > L B ∪ C. Define three acts f , g, h as follows: H= {s/h(s) > P g(s) > P f (s)}; I = {s/g(s) > P h(s) > P f (s)}; J = {s/h(s) > P f (s) > P g(s)}; K = {s/g(s) > P f (s) > P h(s)}; L = {s/f (s) > P h(s) > P g(s)}; M= {s/f (s) > P g(s) > P h(s)}.
The system of inequalities (i) can be rewritten as (where c is the possibility degree of C, etc.)
max (e, f, j, l, m) > max(d, g, h, i, k) ,
(ii-1) max (c, d, i, k, m) > max(b, e, h, j, l) , (ii-2) max (b, g, h, i, j) ≥ max(c, f, k, l, m) .
(ii-3)
It is inconsistent. Indeed, from (ii-1) and (ii-2), one must have max ( f, c, m) greater than all of b, d, e, g, h, i, j, k, l , and this is in contradiction with (ii-3).
-WSP: 
